Taking Ownership

Some of the trees that America planted in Iraq are starting to bear fruit. Via Strategypage, here is some truly outstanding news:

Since November 10th, anti-government forces made twelve attacks on police stations, and were defeated every time. Earlier in November, nine police stations were overrun and no attacked were defeated. Most of this action has taken place in Mosul, where many of the al Qaeda and Baath Party gunmen fled to before the attack on Fallujah. Mosul does not appear to be in any danger of falling under anti-government control. However, anti-government forces are better trained (many were veterans of Saddam’s security forces) and motivated (because they fear retribution from Kurdish and Shia Arab kin of their victims while they worked for Saddam). Those who belong to al Qaeda also have religious fanaticism to propel them. Ongoing reforms in the Iraqi police and military finally got to the point where the police and army troops could organize effective defenses against these police station raids.

The training of the new Iraqi police and security forces has been an integral part of the overall U.S. strategy for winning the war in Iraq. This was a risky bet to place. The U.S. is attempting not only the tactical training Iraqis in fighting off insurgents, they are attempting to confront a cultural issue that is embedded within the modern fabric of Arab culture itself.

The U.S. military structure, with optimal results, emphasizes the empowerment of decision-making ability down to the lowest ranks. This is antithetical to the culture within Arab armies where only the highest ranks control and act upon information. Retired U.S. Army Colonel, Norvell Atkine, who spent years as an advisor tasked with training security and army forces throughout the Middle East, observed the fundamental problem regarding the way Arabs handle information:

In every society information is a means of making a living or wielding power, but Arabs husband information and hold it especially tightly. U.S. trainers have often been surprised over the years by the fact that information provided to key personnel does not get much further than them. Having learned to perform some complicated procedure, an Arab technician knows that he is invaluable so long as he is the only one in a unit to have that knowledge; once he dispenses it to others he no longer is the only font of knowledge and his power dissipates. This explains the commonplace hoarding of manuals, books, training pamphlets, and other training or logistics literature...

...In military terms this means that very little cross-training is accomplished and that, for instance in a tank crew, the gunners, loaders and drivers might be proficient in their jobs but are not prepared to fill in should one become a casualty. Not understanding one another’s jobs also inhibits a smoothly functioning crew. At a higher level it means that there is no depth in technical proficiency.

Atkine continues in his observation of the relationship between officers and enlisted soldiers:

Arab junior officers are well trained on the technical aspects of their weapons and tactical know-how, but not in leadership, a subject given little attention. For example, as General Sa`d ash-Shazli, the Egyptian chief of staff, noted in his assessment of the army he inherited prior to the 1973 war, they were not trained to seize the initiative or volunteer original concepts or new ideas. Indeed, leadership may be the greatest weakness of Arab training systems. This problem results from two main factors: a highly accentuated class system bordering on a caste system, and lack of a non-commissioned-officer development program.

Most Arab armies treat enlisted soldiers like sub-humans. When the winds in Egypt one day carried biting sand particles from the desert during a demonstration for visiting U.S. dignitaries, I watched as a contingent of soldiers marched in and formed a single rank to shield the Americans; Egyptian soldiers, in other words, are used on occasion as nothing more than a windbreak. The idea of taking care of one’s men is found only among the most elite units in the Egyptian military. On a typical weekend, officers in units stationed outside Cairo will get in their cars and drive off to their homes, leaving the enlisted men to fend for themselves by trekking across the desert to a highway and flag down busses or trucks to get to the Cairo rail system. Garrison cantonments have no amenities for soldiers. The same situation, in various degrees, exists elsewhere in the Arabic-speaking countries — less so in Jordan, even more so in Iraq and Syria. The young draftees who make up the vast bulk of the Egyptian army hate military service for good reason and will do almost anything, including self-mutilation, to avoid it. In Syria the wealthy buy exemptions or, failing that, are assigned to noncombatant organizations. As a young Syrian told me, his musical skills came from his assignment to a Syrian army band where he learned to play an instrument. In general, the militaries of the Fertile Crescent enforce discipline by fear; in countries where a tribal system still is in force, such as Saudi Arabia, the innate egalitarianism of the society mitigates against fear as the prime mover, so a general lack of discipline pervades.

This micro-problem is indicative of the overall problem the American effort in the Middle East is trying to solve. Not limited just to their armies, Arab leaders rule their countries by fear through hierarchical structures that keep their populations ignorant, uninformed, suppressed and passive. Past efforts at training Arab armies had to operate within the confines of this culture, however in Iraq, America's purpose was to remove not just a murderous dictator, but the lynchpin that held this dysfunctional system together. Islamic fascism was the blood running through the veins that kept this system alive. The proper metaphor here is to take the system, decapitate it, and let it bleed to death. Only through the death of this culture, will all Iraqis experience freedom.

Stories reported in the media of Iraqis running from battle against seasoned terrorist and Baathist fighters have been very discouraging. However, taken in context of the existing cultural condition the Middle East is in, it is understandable. America is determined that a free, decapitated and bled Iraq will be ripe for reform. Our approach has been to empower the lowest levels of Iraqi society--from training security forces, to rebuilding modern infrastructure, to building local governments--to take ownership of their country. Ultimately, the important news being made isn't going to made by Allawi, al-Sistani et al, it will be made by the "enlisted" members that have been used as windscreens by the elite for far too long. In time, they will be empowered enough to confidently defeat the enemies of freedom.

This news from Mosul is evidence that this bet might just pay off.