Iraq's Future

Steven Den Beste wrote a post predicting what the next year will look like in Iraq. He's not entirely optimistic that we'll see a reduction in terrorism over the next year:

...The native Sunni terrorist campaign will increase in intensity during the next six months or so, possibly as long as a year.

The Sunnis clearly have acknowledged that their decision to boycott the January election was a massive blunder. As a result, the first parliament had a relatively small number of Sunni members, mostly appointed. In the runup to the ratification of the constitution in October, some Sunnis opposed ratification, but others finally gained what was probably the best they could get, an agreement from others in the parliament that when the new one was seated in January that it would consider significant amendments.

What they're hoping to do is to reopen questions which probably were permanently settled in October, most notably regarding federalism. By refusing to participate in the January election, they did not have the influence they really needed during the period in which the details of the constitution were settled, and what they're going to try to do is to replay the game, starting in January.

But they'll still be a minority, both in the parliament (where amendments will have to be approved) and in the country as a whole (where they'd have to be approved by voters). Some of the provisions in the constitution that they want to change are broadly popular. Federalism, in particular, is especially popular with the Kurds.

So what you're going to see is something like the bifurcation of the IRA into an "activist wing" and a "political wing", where those in the political wing disavow any knowledge of the activists and deny any ability to influence them, even though everyone knew they were one and the same.

Sunni members of parliament will begin to make demands for constitutional changes, and as they encounter resistance, there will be a rise of terrorist attacks by the Sunni insurgency. The MPs will regretfully announce that there's nothing they can do about it, but you know, if you just give us ground on these amendments, maybe the attacks will slow or stop.

War is violence intended to accomplish a political goal. The Sunnis have now given up on the idea of preventing a democratic government being formed; it's pretty much now fait accompli. The best they can hope for now is to try to influence the structure and policy of that government to their own benefit.

I can't believe I'm saying this, but I'm not entirely sure this is right.

The reason I think the Sunnis have entered the political process is because they are getting absolutely mauled at their own game. The United States has led an effort that has been one giant, collective demonstration in resolve. Not only have we shown that they are no match for us on the battlefield, they are now having to deal with an increasingly strong Kurdish and Shiite Security Force.

The terrorists biggest wins have been when they hit soft targets. Every once and a while they'll take a lucky swipe at a military target with an IED, but increasingly it is having less of an effect as Iraq is moving in the complete opposite direction from their goals. For the Sunnis to continue their guerrilla war, they are going to need targets and increasingly, these targets are soft (non-military). As the last two years have shown, the insurgency's willingness to hit soft-targets have backfired and public opinion has dramatically shifted from either tacit support or ambivilance, to outright hostility. I think one of the reasons that we have been so quick to gain political traction in Iraq in such a short time, has to do with how quickly Iraqis learned that siding with these murderous bastards is not in their best interests.

The compelling argument that Steven makes is that the Sunnis will do what the IRA and most of the Palestinian movements have done: form bifurcated organization with an "activist" and "militant" wing. The reason I think this is going to be less likely than Steven thinks, is because of how ruthless our efforts in fighting an all out war against them has been. In the case of the IRA, their opponent never dropped the gloves and hunted them down in their own nests. The Palestinian movements have been given broad support locally and internationally, so their violence against their enemy has given them political gains.

The Sunnis are caught. They are jumping on the bandwagon now, because they are isolated and the alternative is annihilation. Their insurgency began with the hope that a prolonged violent campaign (at least in perception), would cause the paper tiger to retreat. They are staring at their worst fears right now: an emboldened population that has now experienced two elections, a strengthening homegrown security force made up of their traditional rivals, and an ally (al-Qaeda) that has been badly beaten both physically and in reputation.

But, I do agree with his last point, which is this:

I think the real make-or-break issue will be a broad amnesty for Sunnis who worked for Saddam. If Parliament is willing to make significant concessions on this -- and I think they will, as long as a few top people are not given amnesty -- then the entire problem could be averted. That's much more important than federalism and it would not require any changes to the constitution.

Bringing peace in Iraq right now lies entirely with the willingness of the Shiites and Kurds to forgive and move on. They have the power to wipe Iraq clean of their Sunni rivals if they chose to do so. The only hope for Sunni survival is through a merciful act that allows them to join. The Sunnis have been drug into the politcal process kicking and screaming, but they are there because they know there is no other way. If the Sunnis continue to chose violence, they are going to be wiped off the map.