Challenging Conventional Thinking

C.S. Scott provides a very interesting analysis on the possible whereabouts of al-Qaeda in Iraq's number one:

The most salient point here is that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi has viewed Iran as an area of retreat in the past and there is little reason to believe that view has changed. With Iraqi security forces taking over more areas of responsibility and Sunni Iraqi insurgents actively fighting al Qaeda in some areas, the possibility of a Zarqawi retreat into Iran is even more likely than previously. On Monday a report coming from Iraqi intelligence bolsters the credibility of the original report we cited two weeks ago.

He then follows up with a more detailed analysis supported by a report on Strategypage (details in italics) of who might be smoking the al-Qaeda out of the grass:

Apparently, al Qaeda-in-Iraq leader Abu Musab al Zarqawi has had to flee from wherever it is he’s been hiding, because members of the Sunni Arab Dulayni tribe are gunning for him. Worse, the tribesmen are suddenly passing on information to American troops and Iraqi police about the location of "foreign fighters" (al Qaeda members) in their territory west of Baghdad. Until recently, the tribe has generally supported the terrorists and anti-government forces, but has kept its options with the government open. For example, one of the principal Dulayni sheiks has sometimes served as a go-between in kidnappings. Reportedly, al Qaeda, unhappy with the “loyalty” of the tribe, and decided to “teach them a lesson.” Al Qaeda killed several members of the tribe in a car bombing in Ramadi early in January. Rather than “learn the lesson,” the Dulayni have apparently decided to knock off Zarqawi.

Interestingly it was members of the Dulaymi tribe that attempted the 1995 coup against Saddam Hussein, attacked Abu Ghraib prison that same year, and may have tipped US forces to the location of Uday and Qusay Hussein in Mosul after the regime collapsed.

Scott's post provides great insight on the level of complexity and the quantity of vissitudes that one must take into account when trying to make sense out of our enemies in Iraq. Far from being a unified body, the insurgency has always been a loosely formed "front" that in-tially used their ambiguity to their advantage, especially in projecting their "mysterious" image to the Western Press. Early on, it was hard to tell who was behind the mayhem--bombs went off in mosques and crowded city centers, Islamists rioted and chanted the demise of the American-led effort, American troops were attacked endlessly with IEDs, citizens were terrorized and burned bodies hung from bridges.

The Western Press, as a whole, projected these ambiguous images back into our living-rooms without much care or insight into what made up the "block" creating this mess. The motives behind this are wide ranging, but the "least offensive" of them was mostly laziness. But all in all, the insurgeny only had one face unified in their opposition to American.

Now that we are getting our first looks into the make-up of "THE INSURGENCY," we are finding that the THE, implying some sort of unified nomenclature in describing THE ENEMY, in reality shows a machiavellian enterprise in its extreme: loose bands of interests who have much to lose if the American-led efforts achieve their strategic goals. But since these groups are so numerous and diverse in their reasons why they chose to fight against the Americans, they have always had a soft-underbelly that could be exposed and exploited over time.

The American-led effort did precisely this. Instead of shrinking back and playing defense in relatively safe areas in Iraq, the military went on the offensive in Western Iraq with the goal of choking those who were set on interrupting democratic process. Almost within weeks after initiating this campaign, American troops were reporting red-on-red (enemy fratricide) fighting. The enemies soft underbelly was being exposed.

This is a game of power. The Baathists want to return to power. Al Qaeda wants to gain power to turn Iraq into their vision of being ruled by radical Islam. Then there are elements like the Dulyami tribe who want control. The Dulyami tribe has shown that they do not favor any group who is in power as they were just as willng to oppose Saddam as they were to oppose the Americans.

Time and resolve, not superior firepower, have been the weapons that have been most effective in defeating the various insurgent groups. Al-Qaeda fallaciously assumed that terror tactics could scare the Americans into a withdrawl, while also assuming the general population of Iraqis would cower in the face of car bombs. They were wrong on both counts--the American's turned up the heat of their offensive and continued to capture and kill insurgent positions, while the general population saw al-Qaeda, not America, as the killers of women and children.

The success of the three major elections in Iraq did more than just bolster the more abstract cause of democracy. Tribal leaders who once supported attacks against the American backed government were rendered impotent as the people voiced their own wishes. The Iraqi people, not the Americans, provided their government's legitimacy. If the tribal leaders continued to resist, they would not only be opposing America, but they would isolate themselves by standing in the way of the majority of Iraqis.

Al-Qaeda unintentionally took the bait, and turned their murderous ways on those they initially fought alongside with in order to entice them back into the fight against the democratic forces. The result of these brutal attacks put the tribal leaders in direct opposition to al-Qaeda. Tribal leaders are ultimately responsible for the health and safety of their people, and al-Qaeda was indiscriminantly murdering them.

Now that we see the make-up of those that make up the collective insurgency, we can begin to understand that the one overriding axiom we can base further analysis is self-preservation. When Scott first relayed reports that it was very likely that Zarqawi was finding refuge in Iran, I was initially dubious. Why would the Iranian government, who hoped for a Shiite controlled Iraq, support a Sunni who has openly proclaimed that the mass murder of the Shiite heretics was a madate from Allah?

Self-preservation. In Iran, Zarqawi finds refuge in an area where the Americans and Iraqi security forces find the most inaccessable politically. Iran, in turn, benefits from having instability in Iraq. If security in Iraq continues to teeter, American forces will be committed to stopping that before they can turn and focus on Iran. Time and resolve helped the Americans get the better of the insurgent groups, but now time is on Iran's side, as they hope America is tied up just long enough for them to finish their developing their nukes.

Anyway, the concluding point here is that there is a lot of stuff happening that doesn't seem to be getting much attention. Whether it's Shiite theocrats harboring Islamist Sunnis or radical tribal insurgents actively fighting radical foreign elements, there is a lot new information being revealed that is challenging conventional wisdom.