Ports Debate

Ok, I'm probably going to take some serious flak for this, as I'm probably one of about four people in the United States that supports the President on the ports deal, but I support the sale to Dubai Ports World for two reasons: 1) the attainment of strategic objectives in the War on Terror, and 2) through an analysis of actual terror risk posed by the UAE as a nation and by its citizens.

The United Arab Emirates, is one of the strongest allies we have in Middle East. But Middle East politics is very complex and muddy, and I think this muddiness in a part of the world where things blowing up on a regular basis (even though not in the UAE) is causing some clearly understandable bi-partisan angst for a large majority of Americans.

To give you a great example of this muddiness, here is how the UAE fit into the geopolitical landscape surrounding Operation Iraqi Freedom:

Although it publicly opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the UAE hosted additionalU.S. forces in the run-up to the March 2003 war (Operation Iraqi Freedom, OIF). The number of U.S. forces in UAE rose from 800 in January 2002 to about 2,000 at the time OIF began. The UAE did allow the United States to upgrade airfields in the UAE thatwere used for U.S. air operations, mainly combat support flights, during the war. As of January 2004, about 1,000 U.S. forces were in UAE to support OIF as well as U.S. operations in Afghanistan, using Al Dhafra air base, Jebel Ali, and naval facilities at Fujairah. The UAE is also providing facilities for Germany to train Iraqi police. As one possible signal of the UAE desire to remain aligned with the United States on Iraq policy despite the difficulties with the U.S. occupation, an heir apparent of one emirate, Ras al-Khaymah, was removed in June 2003, probably because he orchestrated anti-U.S. demonstrations in Ras al-Khaymah before the war. Nonetheless, some UAE officials now complain that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq has paved the way for Shiite Islamists to take power in Iraq; UAE, like most other Arab states, is Sunni dominated.

This reads like a see-saw: publically opposed OIF \ allowed us to use and upgrade military airbases / heir of current emirate publically organizes demonstration opposing war \ heir arrested / UAE Sunnis dubious of Iraq's future as a Shiite dominated State \.

But although policy regarding Iraq has produced some mixed signals, the UAE has recently firmed its relationship with the United States as they have long-standing conflict with Iran, particularly over control of the shipping in the Gulf. The UAE has demonstrated nervousness about Iraqi Shiites, but they are now pouring sweat sweating over the prospect of a nuclear armed Shiite-ruled Iran.

All of the preceding is to provide a little background on our relationship with the UAE as a country in order to properly contextualize this debate.

James Lileks articulates his fears of the ports deal in typically intelligent and verbose fashion:

A few words on the Dubai Ports World imbroglio, written without pause or editing, which is probably just as well. Short version: the administration may have thought it was helping a Valuable Ally and probably a pal, end of story. But it plays like Bush defending eminent domain to condemn a neighborhood to build a mosque.

I don’t make predictions, because – well, who cares? You either repeat the conventional wisdom and hide with the herd when you’re wrong, or buck the prevailing opinions and get a reputation as a “maverick” when you’re wrong, again. Works for some. But if I had to make a prediction, I’d say this: the Dubai-ports fracas will become a flap, quickly swell into a firestorm, then become a debacle before settling into the history books as a “historic miscalculation” – providing the Republicans only lose the Congress. If they lose a city, it will be a “critical turning point.”

Do I expect the managers of the ports to start installing Al Qaeda operatives in key positions, so they can wave through all the containers with small nukes for national distribution? No. But such a scenario does not exact tax the imagination, which is why it’s such a stupendously bad idea.

It’s remarkably tone deaf. It’s possible that the Administration did some quiet polling, and asked the question “How much Arab control over American ports are you comfortable with,” and misinterpreted stunned silence as assent. It’s possible the Administration believed that this would be seen as outreach, an act of faith to solidify a Key Ally, and didn’t think there’d be much hubbub – but if that’s the case, it’s the best example of the Bubble Theory I’ve heard, and I’ve not heard much convincing evidence. Until now. The average American’s reaction to handing port control over to the UAE is instinctively negative, and for good reason. There are two basic reactions: We can’t do this ourselves? and We should trust them, why?

Bold emphasis mine. This argument has cut to the center of what this all comes down to: risk. Clearly our ports are one of the biggest security risks that we face in the United States. As I listed above, the UAE has been a strong ally of ours in the region, but although politcs run by states are one thing, a culture that breeds radicals is another. Lileks is not unreasonably concerned that it is possible that al-Qaeda could penetrate and set the big one off in one of our cities. Well, I do share his concern considering I live in San Francisco and watch the multitudes of cargo ships passing in front of my house daily.

But how well founded is the size of this risk? How radical are the citizens of the UAE? I figured that a decent metric of Islamic radicalism should come from the amount of foreign fighters that have been found in Iraq to see who is putting there money where their mouth is. I Googled around and found this:

Nationalities of 312 Foreign Nationals Captured in Iraq since April 2005 Egypt 78 Iran 13 Syria 66 Palestinians 12 Sudan 41 Tunisia 10 Saudi Arabia 32 Algeria 8 Jordan 17 Libya 7

Others: Britain, Qatar, UAE, India, Denmark, France, Macedonia, Morocco, Somalia, Yemen, Israel, Indonesia, Ireland, Kuwait, United States.

The UAE makes the list, but so does Britain (the host country of the company currently managing our ports) along with Denmark, France, Ireland and even the United States. According to this document, the quantity is unknown, but acccording to this MSNBC article, European countries have provided 3% of the total foreign fighters killed in Iraq.

Islamic radicals who live in Europe have bombed London and Madrid, while also causing numerous riots (most notably in France and Denmark). In looking at the complete picture, why would it be acceptable to bear the risk of a foreign European country to run our ports, versus a country in the Middle East that has been one of our strongest allies in the region? The UAE has been a bit of a seasaw in terms of forgein policy with us, but practical politics mostly due to Iraq aside, their citizens have NOT exactly been flocking to Iraq to kill Americans. Logistically, this is rather remarkable considering radicals in the UAE only have to get through Saudi Arabia to hook up with the insurgents.

Regardless, one of the central strategic objectives in the the war on terror is to provide support for moderate Muslims. It is one thing to support with grandiose speech and "dialog" our "friendship" with the Muslim world, but it is another to outright ban a moderate ally in the Middle East because they are Muslim and the potential exists for radicals to infiltrate.

But I don't want to discount real risk. If there is a real risk, we should treat ALL risk as the same. Based on the proportion of foreign elements we have found in Iraq, I think if you want to take a zero tolerance towards any risk posed by foreign companies managing our ports, you'd have to ban ALL companies regardless of origin. Or, at the very least, European countries should be excluded along with companies based in the UAE based, as the level of radical influence within their respective borders has been comprable, if not less so in the UAE.

Lileks thinks the Administration is being politically tone-def to the majority of the American people, but I think the majority of the American people, and a number of politicians, are knee jerking a bit against an decision that I think is of way more importance than popularity in the polls. What Bush has done very poorly so far, which is par for the course for him, has been in properly communicating solid counter-arguments for those opposing the deal. The President owes the American people a solid explanation that argues against the perceived risks people are carrying with them (regardless of how unfounded they are). He owes this explanation because the American people are the ones that have to bear the consequences of any actual risk involved.

Deficient communication skills aside, and with the caveat that I'm not privy to a lot of intelligence coming across the desk of our decision makers, I'm not convinced the risk is as real as the opposition to this deal makes it seem.

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Postscript: Actually, I think that there is a further case to be made that European countries would have a higher risk before the UAE. This is purely a pragmatic play, and not something that I support as stauch supporter of world-wide democracy, but European democracies are less likely to actively monitor the employees and contractors hired by port managers than a company that falls within the borders of a quasi-monarchy. From a regulation and diplomatic standpoint, it is much easier to deal with an entity that can crack the wip on their radicals without having to deal with laws that restrict government control. With Iran looming across the Straits of Hormuz, I'd say the UAE would have some strong incentives to actively work with us to ensure New York doesn't end up burning because of an Islamist plot using our ports.

Posted by 10 fingers 6 strings at February 22, 2006 09:19 AM | TrackBack