The Battle for Bagdad

Today, Greg Djerejian looks at the situation in Bagdad, and while he sees some progress, he still thinks that there is a policy failure at the top of the American Administration that is feeding the violence that may derail the democratic experiment:

Needless to say, the Iraqi insurgency is not defeated. Equally needless to say, their chances of victory will be exponentially enhanced if a too speedy U.S. withdrawal is pursued...

...In short, we're already doing some of the things the ICG report calls for. But the situation in Baghdad today showcases how we've failed in establishing a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, as the ICG report puts it. And one of the reasons I'm so keen to see Rumsfeld step down or be fired is that he doesn't appear to understand that one of the key prongs of defeating the insurgency means denying the insurgents legitimacy. And, of course, the insurgents derive legitimacy in Sunni areas by, say, arguing that Shi'a death squads are operating with impunity and torturing detainees.

The argument hinges on what I think is a mythic view of force projection within Iraq. Establishing a monopoly on the legitmate use of force, as far as the United States is concerned, cannot be achieved by purely military means. This is a political problem that must be solved, and that decision is above Donald Rumsfeld's pay grade (as Rummy likes to say so often). The United States has a current policy that we are to operate with the approval and cooperation of the elected Iraqi government. I agree with this policy, as it is important that the newly elected government be held responsible for the chaos reigning in their cities, and the long-term success of this "experiment" cannot gain legitmacy if the United States is the one that is constantly cleaning up the mess that stems from these people continuing their pattern of resorting to all out violence when they don't their way.

In the short-to-medium-term, this hard to swallow. The political situation in the capital is very precarious right now, but I am going to argue that I think things are starting to clear in the favor of those who are supporters of the democratic process.

First though, and I can only extrapolate from Gregs post here, I think the insurgency needs to be broken down into it's proper elements, and from there we can determine if it is "defeated" or not.

The Sunni side of the insurgency is composed of many groups, but prodominantly was driven by former Baathists, who had the money, the weapons, and the intelligence network, along with the foreign Sunnis of al-Qaeda in Iraq, who consumed the former's resources and used their fascistic, nihilism to conduct a murderous and bloody campaign that could have made Stalin blush (Zarqawi's crew). This part of the insurgency began to lose any hope of achieving its strategic goals once the United States started choking their strongholds in Western Iraq, while also forming a lethal fighting force made up entirely of indigenous Iraqis. This fighting force, for all the flak the Western Press gave them initially, are now initiating their own campaigns.

The results have been impressive. The Sunnis have split apart, with some understanding that the only hope they have for survival is to join the new democratically elected government. Al-Qaeda decided then to turn their terror tactics on these Benedict Arnolds and their supporters. Unfortunately for Zarqawi, the Sunnis, instead of being terrorized into submission, turned their guns from the American backed coalition onto their former allies. This fight continues today, and al-Qaeda has been so effectively marginalized, it has given up hope of gaining power with their fellow Sunnis in Iraq.

Zarqawi, however, is not going to give up on trying to stop the United States from achieving its objectives. He has given up the fight to return the Sunnis to power, but he still knows that even though al-Qaeda cannot technically win, they can make the United States lose by launching an all out civil war, pitting Sunni versus Shiite. From the Sunni standpoint, the results of an all-out civil war would be catestrophic because the Shiites outnumber them by such a great degree--they would have to leave the country or be exterminated.

This leaves the American effort in a very dangerous and exposed postion--while the Sunni insurgency could be handled through the Pentagon and by our troops on the ground, this new phase has to be handled by first and foremost by Iraqi politics.

Zarqawi has been bannished from Western Iraq, and has re-concentrated within Bagdad. The long-term prospects of operating in an area where your "supply lines" are cut off is suicidal, but his hope is that civil war breaks out before they can be wiped clean. This is a huge gamble, but by attacking Shia populations within Bagdad has given the legimacy to local radical militias such as the Mahdi Army and Badr Brigades. Greg is right, the legitimacy of these groups is disturbing and cannot be tolerated, but I do not believe that the best option for reestablishing a monopoly on power lies within not within Pentagon, but within the Iraqi parliament.

Yikes. Things there have been very frightening, since they haven't been able to establish a government. The more religious and radical side of the Shia political alliance has taken this opportunity during this time of instability to rise up and "promise" protection to their constituents. However, they may have jumped the gun too early. The Shia's know that their power within the country right now hinges on their alliance with each other, and the radical elements within this alliance have fallen out of favor with the most respected Shia in the country, Ayatollah Sistani.

Bill Roggio reports:

As the political deadlock to form the Iraqi government continues, support for Jaafari within the United Iraqi Alliance continues to wane. Another influential member of the UIA has stepped forward and called for Jaafari's resignation following United Iraqi Alliance senior member Kasim Daoud's denouncement of Jaafari's candidacy. Jalal al-Deen al-Saghir, who according to Reuters "sits on SCIRI's main leadership council and is said by Shi'ite politicians to be close to top cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani," has has publicly opposed Jaafari...

...al-Saghir's relationship to Sistani is a strong message, as Sistani is the most respected and revered Shiite cleric in Iraq and the 'glue' holding the disparate blocks of the UIA together. While the various Shiite parties are often at odds and have different political agendas, the need to remain united and maintain a Shiite majority in the parliament is the overriding principle for the existence of the UIA. The memories of Saddam loom large in the eyes of the Shiite political parties.

It is clear Sistani has jettisoned support for Jaafari, which all but spells the end of Jaafari's bid to lead the new government and Sadr's influence with Jaafari. Sadr has overreached with his threats against SCIRI's Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim and members of the UIA, as well as the actions of his Mahdi Army militia, and will pay a harsh political price for his actions.

Al-Sadr in his never-ending quest to gain power has let his Mahdi Army loose and has suffered the consequences. Jaafari allied himself with al-Sadr, and even though he was always opposed by the Kurds and Sunnis, he has now lost the support of his own alliance. In his place it looks like the more moderate and secular Aadil Abdul Mahdi has the upper hand in gaining the Prime Mininster post. If Jaafari is removed and Mahdi is confirmed, the stalemate in the formation of the government will likely end. The goverment will remain intact, and they'll be able to turn their efforts towards fighting the radical militias that refuse to throw down their arms.

The key point that I differ with Greg from is that I am hoping that the Iraqis themselves will handle this crisis. If they can, and there are some positive sign leaning this way, it will go a long way to demonstrate that the Iraqis can work together in this long battle to marginalize their country of those that continually seek power through violence.

The violence in Bagdad is turning out to be a last stand for the most violent parts of the Sunni insurgency, along with the opening shots fired by the radical elements from the Shiites hoping to stand atop of the new government. The violence will not end soon, and to think there is a option out there that can solve this is delusional. This fight is inevitable and it looks as if the moderate voices within Iraq, somehow through all this chaos, are finding a way to surface. This is the most important and best thing that we can hope for. Then the United States, as they stand-by, should be ready to fight alongside the Army they built and trained as soon as the Iraqis can solve their political stalemate.

Posted by 10 fingers 6 strings at April 3, 2006 12:35 PM | TrackBack