![]() April 23, 2006Putting Rummy in Crosshairs--Who Can Help Us Win This Fourth Generation War?I haven't commented much on the recent Rumsfeld flap because I don't believe there has been much substance to it. This is political battle in the heat of war from many sides. The Generals in the middle of the Pentagon who were big advocates of Cold War-style kinetic engagements on a pitched battlefield against Rumsfeld's more technologically reliant, yet pitched battle focus through manuever and speed. With the Generals launching forward in attack, the Democrats smelled blood and, in typical fashion, have attached themselves to those who have launched into full-opposition with someone from the Bush Administration regardless of the actual substance of the attack. In this current "argument" the biggest loser, regardless of outcome, is our country. The debate has come down to one thing: should Donald Rumsfeld lose his job? The most important question of how we can wage a more effective assymetric, or more specifically, Fourth Generation War against our Islamic Fundamentalist foes, has almost been entirely ignored. Like any complex political battle, the lines have become blurred as to where each person actually stood during their relative places in space in time during the initial invasion period. Many of the Left opposed the intitial invasion and thought (hoped?) it would inevitably turn to disaster. Since the lightening quick strike that placed Coalition forces in control of a country the size of California in three weeks, they've looked for a foothold of opportunity to prove that they had been correct in predicting disaster all along. The overall war in Iraq didn't turn out to be as clean as previous operations in Afghanistan. Within a few months, there was a full-fledged insurgency on our hands, and regardless of initial intentions or plans, we found ourselves in the middle of a Fourth Generation war unlike any other we had been a part of. Mistakes were made in the early part of the war by the whole gammut of decision makers. You can point a finger to each and every leader from the President, to the Pentagon, to our boots on the ground, to our Congressional leadership, to our Intelligence Community, etc. Nothing went as it was planned, and given the knowledge and background of our current force structure, it was inevitably going to be a situation where we were going to have to learn hard and fast how to fight and win against an assymetric foe. However, the biggest and loudest criticsms during this time were not substantive, and loudly driven by Left in order to prove that their "patriot" opposition to the "illegal" war in the first place was correct, and they were able to leverage certain military minds who were eager to push back on Donald Rumsfeld in favor of their more Cold-War minded strategies. I'm willing to give our leaders a rather wide-birth when it comes to conducting war. Firstly, there is an opponent on the other end of the stick that gets to have a say in the outcome, and secondly, the thought that there is a plan that can be conceived that can be so swift and decisive is so ridiculously absurd in it face, it can't pass the horselaugh test. There are so many components to geopolitics, kinetic warfare and general circumstances that the only perfect plan is the one developed in hindsight and in my view, this is what the recent Generals jumping on the Rumsfeld-bash wagon are trying to do. Much has been said about the now famous General Eric Shinseki's view that a proper victory in Iraq could not be acheived without the aid of several hundred thousand troops. According to many who have come to throw heeping scorn on the initial invasion plan, these troops would have been able to snuff out the insurgeny before it began. Nothing, however, has been said on exactly how these additional troops would have been used to acheive such a task (Read Bobby Bran's post on the subject. As an Afghan-war veteran and West Pointer, he has a much better and more substantive argument that I can come up with on this). Additional manpower on battlefield essentially helps you to increase kinetic firepower. But one thing our 3 years in Iraq has demonstrated is that if there is any strength American forces already have an abundance of, it is the incredible ability to deliver concentrated and lethal amounts of force at will. What we lack, is the ability to turn that firepower loose on an enemy whose sole purpose is not to beat us on the battlefield, but to cause increasing amounts of disorder in the hopes that American forces will politically be forced to withdraw. Initially, the military strategy for defeating the insurgency was to hunt down and kill or capture as many as possible. While the military was able to do just this, it didn't do much about cutting into the strategy employed by the groups of insurgents terrorizing Iraqis and killing American soldiers in front of the Western Press. Then, after two years of falling-down the stairs, our military and civilian leadership employed a strategy, which I ultimately believe, will give us the best chance of landing on our feet in Iraq. Based on copious amounts of intelligence, they determined that the way to stop bombs from blowing up in Bagdad, was to choke the long supply-lines that originated across the border in Syria, and continued along a network of strategic cities along the Euphrates into Bagdad. However, in conjunction with these operations, they would simultaneously train and put into action an indigenous Iraqi force who would hold ground gained from fleeing or dead terrorists, that were previously abandoned by attacking American forces. It was sound Fourth Generation Military Strategy. The result of this well executed plan was panic in the eyes of our enemy. The most bloodthirsty part of the insurgency, al-Qaeda, began to panic as they started bombing each and everything they could get hit. They bombed women, children, religious sites and those who turned against them. Previously agnostic or sympathetic Sunnis turned against and openly fought them. Once the Iraqi elections were held, Sunnis defied many by turning out in great numbers to partcipate in their new government. Party they joined out of fear and resignation over being at the losing end of this war. Being a true democrat at that point was not the goal, and nor was it in 1865 for the Southerners who were welcomed back into the Union after their bloody rebellion. Now, the political fights are left to the Iraqis, and the end results are far from certain, but that is beyond the scope of this post for now. The American Army learned a tremendous lesson in how to fight Fourth Generation War. Given the sheer size and amount of bureaucracy that comes with such a large and potent force, it is actually remarkable to this average citizen that we responded so "quickly." However, our lessons are far from conclusive as it remains to be seen how much of what we learned has been institutionalized. This is the debate I'd like to be having right now. Unfortunately, the only thing we get is a trumped-up "scandle of the week" designed almost entirely to destroy the credibilty in those in power, regardless of truth, by those who are seeking to regain it. Partisan politics have actually hampered and affected our ability to win a war against a foe that will not give up so easily. I'm not entirely sure how committed Donald Rumsfeld is to waging and winning a Fourth Generation Style War in the long-run, but I do know that he has allowed his commanders on the ground to employ a very risky and ultimately successful strategy in Western Iraq. This is the wide-birth I'm talking about. Under no circumstances am I here to convince anyone that Rumsfeld is blame-free (and as SecDef, he should ultimately be held accountable), but I do believe that it is important that we allow our leadership, civilian and military, some significant room to make mistakes, learn from them, and to refine our warfighting capabilities against a real and nihilistic enemy. We don't have time to take our new ideas into the simulators and war-game them to death. We have to fight now, we are doing so, and have been seeing some favorable results recently. In conclusion I support Rummy to stay on these grounds, as we'd just be firing someone over partisan pressures and mostly likely replacing him not with someone of superior ideas in fighting this war better, but with a contrarian benefitting from serendipidous circumstances. Find me someone with a better pedigree and I might reconsider, but John Kerry, Anthony Zinni and Wes Clark have done nothing but demonstrate that their ideas are a thing of the past, and that is the last place we need to be now. Posted by 10 fingers 6 strings at April 23, 2006 09:05 PM | TrackBackComments
Some six retired or active generals have spoken out against Rumsfeld. Some 6000 have not. Naturally, it's the 6 who make 'the news'. You know why 'the media' is slamming Rumsfeld? Because Bush won Florida in the 2000 election. They're not over it. Posted by: Barry at April 23, 2006 11:36 PMI will comment at the end of the week when I finish reading this post. Glad U R back. Posted by: Rick at April 24, 2006 05:42 AMI think Rumsfeld has done one thing that is critical to fighting a 4th generation war (though I'm skeptical of the whole idea of 4GW, which to me is just counterinsurgency dressed up and with a little lipstick applied, all the better to attract think tank grants) is that he has converted the Army from being built around divisions and reshaped it to being built around brigades -- making deployments easier, and pushing down decision-making from the 2 star generals to the bird colonels. To me, this has made the Army far more flexible in fighting an insurgency because there are more assets available at a lower level of command, and the guys at a brigade/battalion level have the ability to me more creative than the ossified ranks of the general officers, who are generally programmed to fight the wars they learned about when they were lieutenants, 25 years before. Which is not to be a blanket condemnation of the general officer corps, but just an observation. As for more troops on the ground in Iraq -- woulda-shoulda-coulda. I'm not so sure it would have been as easy as it sounds -- there were plenty of logistics issues in putting 150k troops there. Double that number and you need supply bases and trains (at least) twice as big. Twice as many Jessica Lynches riding around in 2 1/2 ton trucks, twice as many unarmored Humvees. And half the incentive to get the Iraqi army running. People say "we should've put half a million men there" as if it is as simple as Captain Picard saying "make it so" -- but that's fully half the Army's combat power in one place. Tours become longer and more frequent. Rotation becomes much harder. Again, I'm not saying that we couldn't have used more troops -- in retrospect, we probably did need more -- but everyone greatly understates the problems that it would have caused. More troops isn't a magic panacea; some in the press want to pretend it is. The answer is we get more Iraqi troops, and get them better trained and organized, and to get a government in place that is accepted as legitimate by the 3 big ethnic factions. I think we're doing that about as fast as we can. Posted by: The Colossus at April 24, 2006 08:22 AMColossus: well said. Whether in military or business, etc., it is now being found that the less top heavy an organization is, the more able they are to execute in the most efficient fashion because they have the flexibility of not being required to report tactical strategy all the way up the line. In the military's case, Rumsfeld has been absolutely dead on in organizing a jointness of operations between branches and to flatten out the levels of command. However, I do believe that 4th generation war is a distinct label as it incorporates the elements of information and intelligence in a much more forward pattern. In my discussion above, it was apparent that we thought overwhelming firepower and killing enough bad guys would be enough as the insurgeny initially gained steam, however it wasn't until we choked out the bad guys through a combination of creating a lethal indigenous force along with an information campaign (which I think is still too weak) designed to combat the assymetries our enemies have mastered, that we started to win. The differences might be subtle, but in Fourth Gen, it is paramount that information is used as a weapon and that specialties normally reserved for Special Ops, like training indigenous forces and building relations with local communities, are integrated on a large scale. Our military did this in Iraq (and did it well!) over the last year, but I'm not sure how much of it is going to become doctrine (I'm not dubious, but I just haven't seen anything that makes me think elsewise). I'd hope so, because I think we'll be involved in many more conflicts like this in the future, versus pitched battles in "open" space. Again, this is the wide birth that I mentioned in my post. We really paved the way and have militarily defeated the insurgency after making a lot of mistakes, but then adjusting and learning from them. Winning a war is not only about who has the best doctrine or plan, it is the one who is also able to adapt to their enemy's strategy more effectively. Holding leaders "accountable" for "failed" planning is just stupid. Holding leaders accountable for not being able to change failing strategies that they refuse to change, however, is necessary--and I've yet to see our civilian or military leadership in Iraq do such a thing so far. Now the political battle remains. Hey, didn't the Iraqis form a government this weekend? ;-) Posted by: TF6S at April 24, 2006 09:16 AMRe: the Iraqi government -- pretty much as predicted by both of us. I see your point about the informational aspect of the war. We have done it very badly, and yet that is probably the center of gravity of the war -- perception shaping reality. There is in our military a strong bias against disseminating propaganda, and except in the SF community, very little military capability in waging psyops. And yet, these matters are now becoming (or always were) central to any winning counterinsurgency strategy. The expression in Vietnam was "grab them by the balls and the hearts and minds will follow"; and I'm afraid that we haven't evolved much from that. We're perfectly fine at the traditional task of killing folks, but we can't seem to issue a decent press release or counter the army of Reuters "stringers", some of whom are undoubtedly on the enemy's payroll. The military will argue it is the CIA's job to do this kind of op, but Congress got the CIA out of that business in the 1970s. I think the military will have to build their own indigenous psyops/intelligence/public affairs capability if it is to be effective; in my mind, the CIA is far too corrupt, political, and too much today a creature of Congress to do the battlefield job. We need Wild Bill Donovan and the OSS. Posted by: The Colossus at April 25, 2006 05:20 AMPost a comment
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