August 02, 2006

The Information War Continues

The current war in Lebannon is just another example of the necessity of understanding not only how to fight the militarily, but also the proceeding information war.

Strategypage reports a chilling "almost," demonstrating yet again how strongly the Hezbollah Islamists grasp this concept:

Israeli troops operating in south Lebanon captured a Hezbollah safe house, and found the usual weapons and other equipment, as well as a supply of Israeli Defense Force uniforms. This indicated plans to stage a major "atrocity." Committed, as the evidence would clearly show, by Israeli troops. But perhaps this will never happen, for Israeli raids into southern Lebanon have captured many Hizbollah documents, as well as some live Hizbollah members. These, combined with Israeli electronic eavesdropping, reports from agents inside Lebanon, give the Israelis a pretty good idea of what Hizbollah is up to. Without much fanfare, Israeli commandos and aircraft will respond to Hizbollah plans.

This is the kind of information war that American troops faced when they were conducting the first battle of Fallujah. During the battle, al-Jazeera broadcasted the massive "atrocities" that American troops were committing against the "civilians" of Fallujah. While our troops on the ground were defeating the armed insurgents, the provisional government almost came apart based on the images and stories that al-Jazeera was reporting. The American halted their offensive and then pulled out. The battle was a strategic, but temporary, loss for the Americans, and we'd spend many more lives to retake the infamous city for good months later.

The Islamists focus directly on the soft underbelly of Western and Israeli hesitation towards the use of force. Regardless of its virtue, it is what the Islamists target in the information war. The world doesn't get outraged when an entire country is held hostage by a proxy army of radicals supported by Iran and Syria. They don't even blink when al-Qaeda marches into Iraqi cities and diliberately starts slaughtering men, women and children in their efforts to turn the town into an Islamic stronghold.

Ralph Peters discusses how this double-standard is playing out with Israel's ability to effectively wage war:

THE airstrike on the Lebanese village of Qana has been a tragedy for Israel. A publicity debacle, the deaths of 57 civilians united Israel's enemies, complicated American support - and may lead to a cease-fire that rewards Hezbollah. The Qana attack can't be excused. But it can be explained.

The images of children's bodies dug out of an apartment building's rubble were a gift to Hezbollah, Syria and Iran - and a direct result of the Olmert government's attempt to wage an "easy" war.

All efforts to make war easy, cheap or bloodless fail. If Israel's government - or our own - goes to war, our leaders must accept the price of winning. You can't measure out military force by teaspoons. Such naive efforts led to the morass in Iraq - and to the corpses of Qana.

Despite one failure after another, the myth of antiseptic techno-war, of immaculate victories through airpower, persists. The defense industry fosters it for profit, and the notion is seductive to politicians: a quick win without friendly casualties.

The problem is that it never works. Never.

Peters ends up being more pessimistic about Israel's situation in this article than I am at this point, but he's dead right here. There is a major fallacy in the Western world that needs to be put to death: the idea that we can wage a clean, neat war--preferrably from the air.

Qana revealed how technology can be turned around and used against a superior force, not by matching it with something more sophisticated, but by changing its calculus. Hezbollah initiated the current conflict, but world opinion, for the most part, was allowing Israel to defend itself in against an act of aggression. After Qana, Israel again became the agressor--they halted bombing for 48-hours.

Israel is on the offensive again, but Olmert must realize that he cannot defeat Hezbollah by hitting their missiles from the sky. Like every war since the inception of air power, it will take an aggresive and unapologetic application of boots on the ground to finish and secure victory.

Posted by 10 fingers 6 strings at August 2, 2006 07:49 AM | TrackBack
Comments

I was pretty critical of the Peters article in my take on it. I think that Israel is a lot more determined than he gives them credit for. There are a lot of people crying "defeat" three weeks into this thing. I think there are pundits who begin to listen to the echo chamber full of talking heads and think they are still talknig about reality -- when in reality, Israel is wiping out Hezbollah. I fear Peters has fallen into this trap.

I have been mulling a long answer to both your posts, as you pose an extremely tough and relevant problem for us. I think that Israel will partly show us the way.

The answer, in part, is to simply do the right thing, and not let the terrorists' propaganda influence your actions. Israel is a very tough state, willing to put up with criticism, isolation, and stern rebukes in the UN while going about the business of killing Hezbollah. Their answer seems to be a very simple one -- not to let the pictures, the press, or the outcry influence their considered military judgment. It is an adult's response to the childish outcries of those who would attempt to sanitize or overemotionalize war. They simply don't listen to the harping of the Andrew Sullivans of the world who cry out for blood one day, only to recoil in horror at blood the next.

How to put that into effect as a policy? I have no idea. Still thinking about it.

Posted by: The Colossus at August 2, 2006 01:52 PM

Great points.

Again, the fog of war is in effect here, and I don't think that we know what Israel's strategy is at this point in the game. Is Olmert using the IDF in the same way that Clinton used air power in Bosnia (hoping to bomb them into submission without risking political capital by taking casualties)? Or is he using it the way that Bush used it in OIF (as a suppliment for increasing and directing fire in concert with a full ground invasion)?

Regardless, I think the perils of air power without boots in the ground is a very important facet to 21st century warfare. I think it is very important especially in what could be "our" next war. When discussion of Iran or Syria pops up, very few people are willing to discuss a full invasion, and the default force application that always comes up is an air war. Experience is telling us that an air war won't necessarily be a cheap and easy option to acheiving any lasting strategic victory. Hezbollah is a master of broadcasting people in civilians lying all over the street, but we know that many of these "civilians" are militiamen dressed in civilian clothes.

I think your point is valid about doing the right thing for the sake of it. The part of information war that America is so bad at, is that we try to please every side of the equation, instead of articulating a clear vision and then carrying it out--very un-Machivellian.

Posted by: TF6S at August 2, 2006 03:21 PM

I think it was an option play. The Israelis have studied our campaigns in some detail, so I think the IDF came to Olmert with some choices.

1. Kosovo. We hit bridges, lines of communication, and key military sites first. It costs us very little in terms of casualties, shapes the battlefield, and possibly puts the lynch mobs in the street against Hezbollah. It's the cheapest way to go. Now if that fails (which it apparently has), we go with

2. Afghanistan. Raids by Special Forces against key ground targets combined with a more vigorous air campaign fewaturing spotters on the ground. Now if that fails (which it apparently has), we go with

3. Traditional ground invasion, occupation, a la the U.S. Army vs. Al Anbar province (Wretchard's "River War"), 2005. Hit and hold key sites with traditional infantry. (This is where we are now). If this fails, we go with

4. Desert Storm. Bring in the armor.

If you think of it as a progressively ratcheting plan, it actually makes a lot of sense. The Israeli cabinet can make a choice at any point and say "Not enough? Let's turn it up! Is that better? Want some more?"

The key thing lost is time, and so it does violate traditional military doctrine in that sense. But I don't think it's an illogical plan, especially if the Israelis are convinced that the solution needs to be political.

Posted by: The Colossus at August 2, 2006 04:13 PM
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